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MCGARVEY  V. WHITTREDGE: CONTINUED 
UNCERTAINTY IN MAINE’S INTERTIDAL ZONE 
Benjamin Donahue* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, William McGarvey and Mary Klientop filed a declaratory judgment 
seeking a determination that their neighbor, Jonathan Bird, had no right to cross 
their intertidal land to reach the ocean to scuba dive.1  McGarvey and Kleintop own 
property that borders Passamaquoddy Bay in the Town of Eastport.2  As upland 
owners of oceanfront property in Maine, their title extends through the intertidal 
zone to the low water mark in fee simple.3  The intertidal land they own also 
stretches in front of Bird’s property, bordering his property just below the high 
water mark.4  This configuration creates a strip that separates Jonathan Bird’s 
property from the bay, allowing him access to the ocean from his property only if 
he crosses over McGarvey’s intertidal land.5  
The Washington County Superior Court granted Bird’s motion for summary 
judgment, declaring that Bird had engaged in a permitted use of the privately 
owned intertidal land.6  In doing so, the court held that scuba diving was within the 
scope of the public’s right to use the intertidal land for navigation.7  McGarvey 
appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, which 
unanimously affirmed the lower court opinion on this point.8  The Court however, 
was sharply divided (3-3) in its reasoning.9  
Private ownership of intertidal land in Maine is derived from a Colonial 
Ordinance enacted by the General Court of the Massachusetts Colony in 1647 (“the 
Ordinance”).10  The Ordinance was introduced to promote the private development 
of intertidal land,11 by facilitating private ownership of intertidal land that 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Canididate 2013. The author would like to thank Professor Orlando E. Delogu for his 
advice and wisdom, and Daphne for being the smartest. 
 1. McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 6, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring) (plurality 
opinion).  William McGarvey and Mary Kleintop are members of the same family that own the disputed 
strip of intertidal land.  Id. ¶ 2.  Mary Kleintop filed the declaratory judgment and appealed the 
Washington County Superior Court’s ruling, but passed away before her appeal was heard by the Law 
Court.  Id.  In this Note both individuals will be referred to as McGarvey.  
 2. Id. ¶ 3. 
 3. Id. ¶ 9. 
 4. Id. ¶ 4. 
 5. Id.  Although Jonathan Bird and Steven Whittredge are named as defendants in the McGarvey 
case, the dispute over the strip of intertidal land was between Bird and McGarvey.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 6. Id. ¶ 7. 
 7. Id. ¶ 2. 
 8. Id. ¶ 1. 
 9. Id.  Justice Silver recused himself from participating in the McGarvey decision.  
 10. Id. ¶ 26. 
 11. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETS 5 (1648), reprinted in THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES 
CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETS 35 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1975). 
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previously belonged to the Crown and was held in trust for the public.12  The 
Ordinance also attempted to protect the public’s rights in the intertidal zone, by 
reserving an easement for the public to use intertidal land to fish, fowl, and 
navigate.13  After the revolutionary war, the Ordinance was adopted into 
Massachusetts common law, and subsequently into Maine common law when 
Maine gained statehood in 1820.14 
In Maine, the common law that has flowed from the Ordinance has allowed the 
public a broad degree of access to the intertidal zone for over 160 years.15  In recent 
years, however (since the Bell cases),16 the public’s access has been curtailed by 
the Law Court’s holding that the scope of the public’s easement in the intertidal 
zone includes only those uses specifically enumerated in the Ordinance, i.e., 
fishing, fowling, and navigation.17  Outside of Maine, the public’s right to access 
the intertidal zone and the shoreline varies. In many states the upland owner’s 
property rights extend only to the high-water mark.18  In these states the entire 
intertidal zone is held for the general public.19 In other states, the upland owner 
holds title to the low water mark (as in Maine), but with a broad easement in the 
intertidal zone for public use.20  Few states restrict the scope of the public’s 
easement to “fishing, fowling, and navigation” as Maine does.21 
This Note will examine the history of the public’s right to use intertidal land in 
Maine, including the relevant common law and statutes.  It will examine the 
development of these rights in other states and the scope of the public’s right to 
access the intertidal zone and shoreline in those states.  After discussing the Law 
Court’s reasoning in McGarvey, this Note will argue that the entire Court should 
have joined Justice Saufley’s reasoning in affirming the lower court opinion 
because Justice Levy’s reasoning is not supported by either case law or public trust 
principles, only by the narrow holding of Bell II, a decision that should no longer 
be considered authority.  Next, it will argue that contrary to the reasoning of Justice 
Levy and the Bell II Court, the uses set forth in the Ordinance were examples of 
permitted uses, not an exhaustive list.  It will then argue that these uses should 
evolve with time, and doing so will not result in an unconstitutional taking of 
private property.  Finally, this Note will argue that the conditions put forth by the 
Law Court in Myrak v. James for breaking away from the doctrine of stare decisis 
are present, and therefore Bell II should be reexamined. 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See id. 
 13. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). 
 14. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 29, 31, 28 A.2d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 15. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
 16. The Bell cases, Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986), and Bell v. Town of 
Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989), are two Law Court decisions that had a significant impact in 
Maine’s public trust doctrine jurisprudence.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 17. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 19. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18 
(2007) [hereinafter Craig I]. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 21. Craig I, supra note 19, at 17. 
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II.  THE LAW 
A.  Applicable Maine State Law 
The origins of Maine’s public trust doctrine trace back to the Justinian codes, a 
principle source of Roman law.22  Roman civilization depended on sea-based 
commerce for survival.23  In order to maintain freedom of navigation and access to 
the sea, Roman jurisprudence recognized the public’s right to the sea.24  The 
Roman authority on public common rights was the Justinian Code. Justinian Code 
2.1.1 reads as follows: 
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running 
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; no man therefore is 
prohibited from approaching any part of the seashore, whilst he abstains 
from damaging farms, monuments, edifices, etc., which are not in 
common as the sea is.25 
Roman law recognized that private land rights should not be exclusive in this 
area.26  It allowed the public to use the seashore, banks of the sea, or a navigable 
river for commerce, fishing, navigation, lateral passage, and other uses.27 
As the Roman Empire declined, the public’s right of common ownership 
waned as feudalism led to an increase in private ownership,28 but in 1215 when the 
Magna Carta was signed, the concept of a public right to common land 
resurfaced.29  The Magna Carta included provisions that limited the power of the 
nobility to lay claim to fisheries or obstruct navigation.30  Out of these restrictions 
arose the predecessor to the public trust doctrine, initially developed by Lord Hale 
and incorporated into his famous treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, 
which borrowed from the Justinian codes.31  Under Lord Hale’s theory, intertidal 
land was held by the Crown, but with a public interest in the jus publicum (land 
vested in the King and the public).32  This theory eventually developed into the 
public trust doctrine.33  Under that doctrine, the Crown owned the intertidal land, 
but held it subject to the public’s right of use.34  These same principles applied in 
colonial America; the King of England possessed all vacant lands in a trust for the 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Mitchell M. Tannenbaum, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine’s Submerged Lands: Public 
Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105, 108 (1985). 
 23. See Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern Relevance, 
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 849 (1982). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 849-50 (quoting Inst. Just. 2.1.1). 
 26. Id. at 852. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Tannenbaum, supra note 22, at 108. 
 29. Id. at 109. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Butler, supra note 23, at 860, 862. 
 32. Id. at 862. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894). 
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nation.35  After the American Revolution, the intertidal zone, previously held by the 
Crown, became the property of the sovereign states.36 
The decision that has had the greatest impact on the public’s right to Maine’s 
intertidal zone and shoreline took place before the American Revolution.  Under 
English law and the principles of the public trust doctrine, the Crown had the 
discretion to seize every building or wharf that was built below the high-water 
mark.37  This made private landowners hesitant to invest in structures that ventured 
below the high water mark.38  In an effort to promote waterfront development, 
governments of certain colonies, including Massachusetts, allowed the owners of 
upland property greater rights below the high water mark.39  In 1647, the General 
Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted an ordinance granting upland 
owners property rights down to the low water mark.40  When Massachusetts 
became a state, the principles of the Ordinance were incorporated into its common 
law.41  In 1820, when Maine was granted statehood, the principles of the Ordinance 
were said to be adopted into Maine’s common law under Article X of the Maine 
Constitution, which incorporated the laws of Massachusetts into Maine’s common 
law.42  Maine did not adopt the language of the ordinance itself, only the custom of 
private ownership of intertidal land, created by the Ordinance and sustained by the 
judiciary.43 
Public access to Maine’s intertidal land and shoreline has varied throughout 
Maine’s history, as the Law Court’s interpretation of the Ordinance has changed 
with time.  Since the beginning, the Court has accepted the traditional uses of 
“fishing, fowling, and navigation” and their derivatives,44 but early on the Law 
Court demonstrated that it would not be bound by the literal uses put forth in the 
Ordinance.  For example, the Law Court has found that the public’s rights in the 
intertidal zone include the right to use it as a public highway when frozen,45 for 
recreational purposes,46 and to allow the public to not only navigate over the 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. at 14. 
 36. Id. at 15. “When the Revolution took place, the people of each State became themselves 
sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under 
them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the 
general government.”  Id. at 16 (quoting Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 367 (1842)). 
 37. Id. at 13. 
 38. STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 318 (3d 
Ed. 1888). 
 39. Shively, 152 U.S. at 18. 
 40. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 11, at 35. 
 41. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810). 
 42. ME. CONST. art. X, §§ 3, 5; Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831).  Only laws “not 
repugnant” to the interests of the new state were received, and no Maine legislative enactment has 
embraced the Ordinance.  ME. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
 43. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 184 (Me. 1989). 
 44. Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 447 (1882). 
 45. French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434 (1841). 
 46. Smart v. Aroostock Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37, 48, 68 A. 527, 532 (1907); see also Deering v. 
Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 65 (1845).  
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intertidal zone, but to land a vessel, and offload that vessel.47  In 1985, the Maine 
Legislature for the first time addressed the intertidal zone, and enacted the Public 
Trust in Intertidal Land Act in an attempt to codify and clearly define the public’s 
rights on intertidal lands.48  The legislature included as public trust rights, not only 
the traditional uses of fishing, fowling and navigation, but the right to use intertidal 
land for recreation, and any other trust rights to use intertidal land recognized by 
the Maine common law and not specifically abrogated by statute.49 
Despite these precedents, which clearly showed a departure from the three uses 
included in the language of the Ordinance (fishing, fowling, and navigation), the 
Law Court’s 1989 decision in Bell II limited the scope of the public’s rights to 
these three uses, negating both the holdings of previous courts and the Maine 
Legislature’s attempt to define the scope of the public’s rights in the intertidal 
zone.50  The holding in Bell II was the first time the Court found “fishing, fowling, 
and navigation” to be the only permitted uses.51  In doing so, the Court did not 
overrule the prior Maine case law, but limited it, and in the process declared the 
Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act unconstitutional.52  After Bell II, public rights in 
the intertidal zone were defined as an easement “only for fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.”53 
B.  Perspective 
Nationally, there is no consensus on the scope of the public’s rights to access 
the intertidal zone and the shoreline.  In western states, where public trust 
jurisprudence developed after the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in 
Shively v. Bowlby, there is a general uniformity; public use rights in the intertidal 
zone are broadly defined and protected.54  In eastern states, where courts and 
legislatures addressed intertidal property rights long before the U.S. Supreme Court 
examined the matter, the public’s right to access intertidal land and the shoreline 
varies greatly from state to state.55  
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a private landowner cannot be the grantee of 
a property right below the high-water mark unless the grantor is the state itself.56  
The Court limited a state’s right to make such a grant when it held that the state of 
Illinois could not grant all of the land below the high water line in Chicago Harbor 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536, 45 A. 497, 498 (1900) (“Others may sail over [the 
intertidal zone], may sail over them, may moor their craft upon them, may allow their vessels to rest 
upon the soil when bare, may land and walk upon them . . . .”). 
 48. P.L. 1985, ch. 782 (codified at ME REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 571-573). 
 49.  ME REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 571. 
 50. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 177 (Me. 1989). 
 51. See McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 39, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring) (“We had not, until 
Bell II, restricted the activities allowed by the jus publicum to the specific references in the Colonial 
Ordinance.”). 
 52. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177. 
 53. Id. at 173.  The public’s rights in the intertidal zone have been referred to as an easement in 
previous Law Court cases, but were only defined as such in the Bell cases.  See id. 
 54. Craig I, supra note 19, at 19. 
 55. Id. at 11. 
 56. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894). 
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to the Illinois Central Railroad Company.57  It has also recognized three basic uses 
of the public trust: fishing, navigation, and commerce.58  These holdings are 
reflected in western states’ public trust doctrines where in the vast majority of 
states, the private landowner owns only to the high water line.59  Although most 
western states initially accepted the three basic uses of fishing, navigation, and 
commerce, almost all have since expanded their public trust doctrines to include 
recreation as a permitted use.60 
In many eastern states, the upland owner only owns to the high water line.61  In 
these states the public has unfettered rights on intertidal land.62  In other states, like 
Maine, the upland owner has qualified title to the low water mark, subject to a 
reserved public easement.63  In some eastern states where the intertidal zone is 
privately owned, the public’s rights in the intertidal zone are nevertheless very 
broad.  For example, New Jersey has expanded on the traditional public trust rights 
of fishing and navigating to include modern activities like sun bathing, swimming, 
and other shore activities.64  In Neptune City v. Avon, when the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine protects these modern activities, it 
noted that, “[t]he public trust doctrine, like all other common law principles, should 
not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet 
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”65  Other 
states have expanded on traditional uses as well.  New Hampshire, whose public 
trust doctrine originally mirrored Maine’s, has expanded on “fishing, fowling and 
navigation” by including “all useful purposes.”66  Few states have limited the scope 
of the public’s easement within the intertidal zone to traditional uses.  Of the states 
that have followed this path, only Delaware has a public trust doctrine that restricts 
the public’s rights in the intertidal zone as narrowly as Maine.67  Even 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 464 (1892). 
 58. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57. 
 59. Only lands that border a “navigable” body of water are subject to the Jus Publicum and a 
particular state’s public trust doctrine. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842).  In England, only 
property subject to the ebb and flow of the tide was considered “navigable.”  Id. at 414.  In the United 
States, navigable waters are not limited to those influenced by the tide.  Id.  Whether or not a body of 
water is navigable raises questions of federal and state law.  Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide 
to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward 
an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 61 (2010) [hereinafter Craig II].  How a state defines 
what is a navigable waterway will determine what bodies of water are subject to the public trust 
doctrine.  Id. at 62.  Many tests for navigability focus on whether a water way can be used for 
commerce.  Id. at 65.  Different definitions of navigability allow the public trust doctrine to be applied 
in states that do not have coastline or tidally influenced bodies of water.  See id.  
 60. See Craig II, supra note 61, at 82. 
 61. Craig I, supra note 19, at 16-17.  See also, e.g., Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 
564 (Conn. 2001). 
 62. Craig I, supra note 19, at 17-18. 
 63. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005). 
 64. Neptune City v. Avon, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 1972). 
 65. Id. at 54.  
 66. Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 721 (N.H. 1890). 
 67. In Delaware, the upland owner owns to the low-water mark.  The public has an easement to fish 
and navigate.  Groves v. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. 92A-10-003, 1994 WL 89804, at *5-6 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 8, 1994). 
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Massachusetts, a state that derives its intertidal land law from the same colonial 
ordinance as Maine, has public trust rights slightly more expansive than Maine’s.68 
III.  THE MCGARVEY CASE 
To access the ocean from his property and operate commercial scuba diving 
tours, Bird and his clients walk across intertidal land owned by McGarvey.69  
McGarvey also alleged that Bird engaged in social activities on the intertidal 
land.70  At no point during the scuba dives did Bird or his clients use a boat, or 
engage in any activities that could be construed as fishing or fowling.71  In 
November of 2008, McGarvey sought a determination that Bird had no right to 
cross his intertidal land, asserting that Bird’s actions did not fall within the scope of 
the public’s easement within the intertidal zone.72  Bird counterclaimed, seeking a 
declaration that his uses were lawful.73 He argued that the scope of the public’s 
easement encompassed scuba diving, because scuba diving falls within the 
meaning of “navigation.”74  
In January of 2010, the Washington County Superior Court granted a summary 
judgment in favor of Bird.75  The court declared that crossing intertidal land to 
scuba dive, for either recreational or commercial purposes, was within the scope of 
the public’s right to navigate on intertidal land.76  The court also determined that 
the social activities that Bird and his clients engaged in after scuba diving were not 
within the scope of the public’s easement, and therefore constituted trespassing.77  
The court awarded McGarvey nominal damages of one dollar, plus interest.78 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Law Court’s Reasoning 
The McGarvey case presented a vehicle for the Law Court to reexamine their 
narrow holding in Bell II and the public’s rights within the intertidal zone. On 
appeal, appellees Jonathan Bird and Steven Whittredge made only the narrow 
argument that scuba diving falls under the definition of “navigation” as defined by 
the colonial ordinance.79  The Court unanimously accepted the argument that 
crossing the intertidal zone to scuba dive was a permissible use by the public, but 
was split on whether to affirm the lower court by accepting the argument put forth 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Anderson v. De Vries, 93 N.E.2d 251, 255-56 (Mass. 1950).  The Massachusetts Judicial 
Supreme Court has wavered in its interpretation of the Colonial Ordinance.  Although it has refused to 
recognize a general recreational easement, it has recognized a right of the public to bath or swim.  Id.  
 69. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 4-5, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 70. Id. ¶ 6. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Brief of Appellee at 1, McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620 (No. Was–10–83). 
 75. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 7, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Brief of Appellee, supra note 74, at 1. 
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by several amici, i.e., the Surfrider foundation, the State of Maine and Professor 
O.E. Delogu, that Bell II should be reexamined and that the public’s rights in the 
intertidal zone should be expanded beyond the narrowly defined “fishing, fowling, 
and navigation only” easement fashioned in Bell II.80  
In her separate opinion, Chief Justice Saufley accepted this argument, but fell 
short of the necessary votes to make a more meaningful change in Maine’s 
intertidal land law.81  In affirming the lower court and finding that the public has a 
right to walk across the intertidal zone to scuba dive, the Saufley opinion went 
beyond the Appellee’s argument that scuba diving could be shoehorned into the 
definition of navigation.82  Chief Justice Saufley found instead that Maine’s public 
trust doctrine reaches back to Lord Hale’s treatise,83 and includes the public right to 
walk across intertidal land and engage in water related recreation activities.84  This 
argument, if adopted by the majority of the Court, would expand Bell II’s reasoning 
and the public’s rights in the intertidal zone beyond the traditional uses of “fishing, 
fowling, and navigation.” 
To support the argument that Maine’s public trust doctrine includes this 
additional right, the Saufley opinion looks back in time before Bell II, and 
acknowledges that the limiting language we rely upon today to define the public’s 
rights in the intertidal zone did not arise from the language of the Ordinance, or 
Law Court precedent prior to Bell II, but from the Bell II decision itself.85  Chief 
Justice Saufley’s opinion refused to confirm the fixed and narrow interpretation of 
the Ordinance in Bell II, recognizing how impracticable it would be if the public’s 
use of the intertidal zone was forever “so severely limited that only a person with a 
fishing rod, a gun, or a boat could walk upon that land.”86  Instead, the Saufley 
opinion argued that the common law must be allowed to evolve to “reflect the 
realities of a changing world,”87 rejecting the argument made by amici Thaxter and 
the Justice Levy, that stare decisis prohibits the Law Court from expanding on the 
limited uses defined in Bell II.88 
Justice Levy’s separate opinion inexplicably stood by the holding of Bell II, 
refusing to expand on the permitted public uses in the intertidal zone as defined in 
that case.89  The Levy opinion accepted the appellee’s argument that scuba diving 
should be included in the definition of “navigation,” but refused to accept the 
argument put forth by the State, Delogu, and by Chief Justice Saufley, that the 
public’s rights in the intertidal zone should be expanded beyond those examples set 
forth in the Ordinance.90 
                                                                                                                 
 80. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 48, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 81. Id. ¶ 53. 
 82. Id.. 
 83. Id. ¶ 36. 
 84. Id. ¶ 58. 
 85. Id. ¶ 56. 
 86. Id. ¶ 55. 
 87. Id. ¶ 9. 
 88. Id. ¶ 63 (Levy, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. ¶ 59. 
 90. Id. ¶ 78. 
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The Levy opinion focused on a number of different principles in its reasoning, 
but relied most heavily on stare decisis.91  In rejecting the proposition that the 
public’s rights in the intertidal zone should be expanded upon, it stressed that the 
principles of stare decisis and respect for legal precedent lend stability to the law 
and enable “the public to place reasonable reliance on judicial decisions affecting 
important matters.”92  It noted that these principles are especially important when a 
decision concerns “the stability of the legal concepts of property in the State.”93 
The Levy opinion argued further that Bell II did not represent a change in 
Maine’s intertidal land law.  It contended that Bell II was not the first Law Court 
decision to limit the public’s right in the intertidal zone to fishing, fowling, and 
navigation and that these basic rights have been the only permitted public trust 
rights throughout Maine’s history due to the limiting nature of the Ordinance.94  It 
concluded that because of the uniform precedent, the principles of stare decisis 
firmly applied, and no justification existed to reexamine Bell II.95  Accordingly, the 
Levy opinion went on to note that expanding the public’s rights within the 
intertidal zone would result in an unconstitutional taking of private upland owners’ 
property.96 
Instead of affirming the lower court by including scuba diving as a permitted 
public trust use alongside fishing, fowling, and navigation, the Levy opinion turned 
to the language of Bell II that limits the scope of the public’s easement to fishing, 
fowling, and navigation, but requires that these terms should be given a generous 
interpretation.97  Relying on this language, Justice Levy found that scuba diving 
falls within the meaning of “navigation.”98  Although scuba diving is arguably a 
complicated form of bathing (a prohibited use),99 the Levy opinion distinguished 
scuba diving from basic bathing.100  To accomplish this, it turned to a 1907 
decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court that defined navigation as “passing 
freely over and through the water without the use of any of the land underneath.”101  
The Levy opinion reasoned that scuba diving is not bathing because it involves 
“passing freely over and through the water without any use of the land underneath,” 
has qualities of navigation, and requires complicated equipment and the use of 
underwater navigational aids such as watches, depth gauges and compasses.102  
Finally, the Levy opinion found that because the public has a right to walk across 
privately held intertidal land to engage in “navigation,” crossing over the intertidal 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. ¶ 63. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. ¶ 65 (quoting Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 518 (Me. 1986)). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. ¶ 66. 
 96. Id. ¶ 65. 
 97. Id. ¶ 65. 
 98. Id. ¶ 77. 
 99. Because Bell II makes it clear that “bathing” is not a permitted use, if scuba diving falls within 
the definition of “bathing” instead of “navigation,” it would not be considered within the public’s rights 
in the intertidal zone.  Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 174 (Me. 1989). 
 100. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 75, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. ¶ 73 (quoting Butler v. Attorney Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1967)). 
 102. Id. ¶ 75 (quoting Butler, 80 N.E. at 689).   
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zone to scuba dive is within the scope of the public’s easement in the intertidal 
zone.103 
In sum, although both separate opinions affirmed the lower court, they took 
different routes to achieve this result.  One, Chief Justice Saufley’s, leaves the door 
open to the possibility that the public’s rights in the intertidal zone will not forever 
be defined by the limiting holding of Bell II.  The other, Justice Levy’s, accepts the 
limiting language of Bell II that constrains the public’s rights to those uses 
enumerated in the 1647 Colonial Ordinance.   
B.  Critique and Impact 
In this writer’s view, the Law Court should no longer rely upon the precedent 
set forth in Bell II and the limiting language that arose from that case to define the 
public’s rights within the intertidal zone.  The Court cannot forever interpret the 
term “navigation” to encompass new uses. While the Saufley separate opinion 
attempts to modernize Maine’s public trust doctrine and break free from the narrow 
holding of Bell II, the Levy separate opinion strictly adheres to Bell II and reads 
into the Ordinance artificial language not found in its text.  It refuses to allow the 
public’s easement to evolve to serve the purpose for which it was granted, fails to 
recognize that the Myrick criteria for overriding stare decisis have been met, and 
continues to apply stare decisis blindly.   
1.  The Ordinance Does Not Limit the Public’s Uses of Intertidal Land to Fishing, 
Fowling, and Navigation 
If the wording of the Ordinance continues to define property boundaries at the 
high and low water marks and the public’s rights in the intertidal zone covering 
Maine’s almost 3500 miles of coastline,104 its language should be subject to 
scrutiny.  The Law Court’s interpretation in Bell II should not forever define the 
public’s rights in the intertidal zone.  The Ordinance itself uses the terms “fishing, 
fowling, and navigation” as examples of public uses within the intertidal zone 
common to the mid-1600s,105 there is no indication that these terms were intended 
henceforth to be exhaustive of all public uses.106  If the holding of Bell II is ignored 
and the language of the Ordinance examined, no limiting language is found.  The 
Ordinance reads as follows: 
Everie Inhabitant who is an Hou[se]-holder [s]hall have free fi[s]hing and 
fowling, in any great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers [s]o far as the Sea 
ebs and flows, within the precincts of the town where they dwell, unles[s] 
the Free-men of the [s]ame town, or the General Court have otherwise 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. ¶ 77. 
 104. 1995 ALMANAC 495 (48th ed. 1995). 
 105. This is consistent with the proper rules of statutory construction. See Orlando E. Delogu, Friend 
of the Court: An Array of Arguments to Urge Reconsideration of the Moody Beach Cases and Expand 
Public Use Rights in Maine’s Intertidal Zone, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 47, 93 (2010). 
 106. Historically, the Colonial Ordinance had never been treated as permanently defining the public’s 
right to the intertidal zone.  McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 38, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).  The 
words “only” and “delimit” are not found in prior Maine case law dealing with public use of intertidal 
land, they are fashioned out of whole cloth by the Bell II court.  See Delogu, supra note 105, at 93. 
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appropriated them. Provided that no town [s]hall appropriate to any 
particular per[s]on or per[s]ons, any great pond containing more th[a]n ten 
acres of land: and that no man [s]hall come upon anothers proprietie 
without their leave otherwi[s]e then as hereafter expre[ss]ed; the which 
clearly to determin, it is declared that in all creeks, coves and other places, 
about and upon falt water where the Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor of 
the land adjo[i]ning [s]hall have proprietie to the low water mark where 
the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more wherefoeever it 
ebs farther. Provided that [s]uch Proprieto[r]; [s]hall not by this libertie 
have power to [s]top of hinder the passage of boats or other ve[ss]els in, or 
through any [s]ea creeks, or coves to other mens hou[s]es or lands. And 
fore great Ponds lying in common though within the bounds of [s]ome 
town, it [s]hall be free for any man to fi[s]h and fowl there, and may 
pa[ss] and repa[ss] on foot through any mans proprietie for that end, [s]o 
they tre[s]pa[ss] not upon any mans corn or meadow.107  
The word “only,” is absent from the Ordinance.  It did not surface in Maine’s 
public trust doctrine jurisprudence until the narrow judicial construction in Bell 
II.108  Law Court cases prior to Bell II recognized the lack of limiting language and 
showed a willingness to stray from the language of the Ordinance; no case treated 
the language of the Ordinance as “permanently defining” or limiting the public’s 
rights.109  In 1882, the Law Court expressly stated that it would not be bound by the 
literal uses put forth by the Ordinance.110  This sentiment prevailed prior to Bell II, 
as permitted public trust uses evolved to reflect changes in society and technology 
that resulted in different public needs within the intertidal zone.111  Those cases 
acknowledge that the jus publicum represents public rights that are not static, but 
that evolve and change with time.112  Only in Bell II did the Law Court interpret the 
Ordinance to constrain the public’s rights to those uses enumerated in the 
Ordinance.113  
                                                                                                                 
 107. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETS, supra note 11, at 35. 
 108. Delogu, supra note 105, at 93.  See also Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 51, 760 A.2d 
232 (Saufley, C.J., concurring) (“By our unduly narrow judicial construction of the time-honored public 
trust doctrine, our holding in [Bell II] restricted the public’s right to peaceful enjoyment of one of this 
state’s major resources, the intertidal zones.”). 
 109. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 38, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).  
 110. Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441 (1882) (“[i]t is clear that the courts in Maine have adopted a 
rule in relation to the flats which is peculiar to our jurisdiction, showing that we are not bound by the 
literal expression of the ordinance, even as a common law rule.”). 
 111. See, e.g., French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434 (1841) (travel permitted on frozen intertidal zone); 
Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536, 45 A. 497, 498 (1900) (“[The public] may sail over [the intertidal 
zone], may moor their craft upon them, may allow their vessels to rest upon the soil when bare, may 
land and walk upon them.”). 
 112. See Delogu, supra note 105, at 96 (“The [concept of the public trust doctrine] has never been a 
static one.  Public uses of critical, unique intertidal lands have continuously changed over time; they 
must continue to do so.  Bell II has the effect of freezing the public use rights at a point in time nearly 
350 years ago.”). 
 113. Id.  
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2.  The Public’s Easement Should Evolve to Serve the Purpose for which it Was 
Granted 
If the public’s rights within the intertidal zone are defined as an easement, the 
Law Court should allow the easement’s scope to evolve to serve the purpose for 
which it was granted.  Maine property law has long recognized that easements 
should be construed to permit uses other than those originally reserved by the 
grantor, as long as the new uses are consistent with the purpose for which the 
easement was originally granted.114  In Guild v. Himen, the Law Court stated that: 
“The use of an easement ‘may vary from time to time with what is necessary to 
constitute full enjoyment of the premises,’ and an express easement may 
accommodate modern developments.  Any change in use however must be 
consistent with the purpose for which the easement was originally granted.”115  If it 
is accepted that the Ordinance was a grant, then the purpose of the easement 
reserved for the public to fish, fowl and navigate was to preserve the public trust 
doctrine, protect the jus publicum, and the public’s right to use intertidal land and 
access the shoreline in the wake of the upland owner’s newly acquired property 
rights.116  Fishing, fowling, and navigation were the common public uses in the 
intertidal zone at the time the easement was created, not the purpose for which the 
easement was granted.117  
Before Bell II, the Law Court facilitated the evolution of the public’s 
easement, permitting uses besides those included in the language of the 
Ordinance.118  Only in Bell II did the Law Court narrow the scope of the public’s 
easement to only include the uses enumerated in 1647.119  If this limited and 
incorrect interpretation of the public’s easement is forever accepted by Maine’s 
courts, it will eventually result in a contraction in the scope of the public’s 
easement within the intertidal zone.  When there are no fish or fowl left, or their 
exploitation is no longer permitted, the public’s access to the intertidal zone will be 
limited to navigation or a derivative thereof that has been allowed by the Court.  At 
this point it will be the public, not the private landowner, that will suffer a loss of 
property rights.120  The public should be allowed to enjoy the use of its easement 
for the purpose for which it was granted: use of the intertidal zone, access to the 
ocean, and preservation of the jus publicum.  
                                                                                                                 
 114. See Stevens v. Anderson, 393 A.2d 158, 159 (Me. 1978) (holding that an easement that 
originally reserved the right to pass across a lot of land for “cattle teams and foot passengers” should be 
construed to include motor vehicles).   
 115. Guild v. Hinman, 1997 ME 120, ¶ 6, 695 A.2d 1190 (quoting Willband v. Knox Cnty. Grain 
Co., 128 Me. 62, 71, 145 A. 405, 409 (1929)); Stevens v. Anderson, 393 A.2d 158, 159 (Me. 1978). 
 116. Delogu, supra note 105, at 93. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 187-89 (Me. 1989) (Wathen, J., dissenting). 
 119. Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 51, 760 A.2d 232 (Saufley, J., concurring). 
 120. Justice Levy argues that allowing the scope of the public’s easement to evolve will cause upland 
owners to suffer a taking.  See discussion infra Part.IV.B.3. 
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3.  Allowing the Scope of the Public’s Easement to Evolve Will Not Result in an 
Unconstitutional Taking 
The Levy opinion, guided by Bell II, argues that if the scope of the public’s 
easement is expanded beyond the traditional uses of fishing, fowling, and 
navigation, there will be an unconstitutional taking of private property, regardless 
of whether the change comes from the legislature or the judiciary.121  This 
argument is based on the premise that allowing the public’s easement in the 
intertidal zone to evolve beyond its original scope will burden the upland 
landowner’s servient estate and therefore result in a taking.122  It overlooks the 
principles of Maine property law put forth in the section above.123  If the public’s 
easement evolves to encompass new uses that serve the original purpose of the 
easement, this change will not result in a transfer of property rights and therefore 
will not burden the upland owner’s servient estate.124  The public’s easement in the 
intertidal zone was established to protect the jus publicum, the public’s right to 
access the intertidal zone and the shoreline.  Allowing an easement to evolve to 
serve this purpose will not be considered a taking of property. 
4.  Stare Decisis Should Not Prevent the Law Court from Re-examining Bell II 
Contrary to the dogmatic application of stare decisis in the Levy opinion, the 
Law Court is not prevented from re-examining Bell II.  Though the Law Court has 
stressed the need for the “uniformity and certainty” that stare decisis provides, it 
has also recognized the dangers that arise from the blind application of bad or 
incorrect law.125  The Law Court has acknowledged that there are circumstances in 
which it is appropriate for the Court to set the doctrine aside.126  In Myrick v. 
James,127 the Law Court laid out a five-factor test to determine when it is 
appropriate to reconsider the holding of a previous decision.128  The factors are as 
follows: 
(1) [T]he court is convinced that the rule of the prior decision operates 
harshly, unjustly and erratically to produce, in its case-by-case application, 
results that are not consonant with prevailing, well-established 
conceptions of fundamental fairness and rationally-based justice, (2) that 
                                                                                                                 
 121. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 65, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring). 
 122. See Bell II, 557 A.2d at 176-77. 
 123. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
 124. Guild v. Hinman, 1997 ME 120, ¶ 6, 695 A.2d 1190. 
 125. Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 935 (Me. 1982). 
 126. Id.  The doctrine, however, “‘is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence 
to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a 
prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.’”  Id.  
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))  
 127. 444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982).   
 128. We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule 
requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions and that 
when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior 
decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a 
rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.   
Id. at 998 (quoting Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1959)). 
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conviction is buttressed by more than the commitment of the individual 
justices to their mere personal policy preferences, that is, by the 
substantial erosion of the concepts and authorities upon which the former 
rule is founded and that erosion is exemplified by disapproval of those 
conceptions and authorities “in the better-considered recent cases and in 
authoritative scholarly writings,” (3) the former rule is the creation of the 
court itself in the legitimate performance of its function in filling the 
interstices of statutory language by interpretation and construction of 
vague, indefinite and generic statutory terms, (4) the Legislature has not, 
subsequent to the court’s articulation of the former rule, established by its 
own definitive and legitimate pronouncement either specific acceptance, 
rejection or revision of the former rule as articulated by the court, and (5) 
the court can avoid the most severe impact of an overruling decision upon 
reliance interests that may have come into being during the existence of 
the former rule by creatively shaping the temporal effect of the new rule 
articulated by the holding of the overruling case.129 
Applying the factors to Bell II, it becomes clear that all the requirements have been 
met.130  The Levy opinion seems to ignore these facts. 
By limiting the public’s easement to “fishing, fowling, and navigation only,” 
the Bell II court attempted to settle and clarify the public’s rights in the intertidal 
zone, but its effect was to stifle the evolution of Maine’s intertidal land law.  The 
result is a precedent that will continue to produce unfair and erratic results for the 
public attempting to make use of Maine’s intertidal zone and shoreline.  To 
determine whether a use or activity is within the scope of the public’s easement 
under Bell II, a Maine court must either attempt to “shoehorn” that use into one of 
the above terms or conclude that the use is impermissible.  As evidenced by the 
McGarvey case, future litigation will turn on the meaning of “navigation,” and the 
Law Court will have to draw arbitrary lines with certain uses falling within the 
definition of “navigation” while others are excluded.  In McGarvey, the Levy 
opinion reasoned that scuba diving falls under the definition of navigation.131  
While this may be accurate, the framework used to determine this outcome is 
primitive.  If this is how future challenged uses are analyzed, the results will indeed 
be erratic at best, or worse, will unduly narrow public use of intertidal lands. 
The argument that the narrow holding of Bell II will lead to unpredictable and 
unfair litigation, although most frequently voiced by Chief Justice Saufley,132 has 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. at 1000. 
 130. Additionally, Chief Justice Saufley has argued that all the Myrick factors have been met.  Eaton 
v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 54 n.9, 760 A.2d 232 (Saufley, J., concurring).  
 131. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 76, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring).  The Levy separate opinion 
distinguishes scuba diving from the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s definition of bathing (an 
impermissible use) in Butler v. Attorney Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (1907), by noting that scuba diving 
involves “passing freely over and through the water without any use of the land underneath.”  
McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 74, 28 A.3d 620.  The opinion also notes that “as a matter of function” scuba 
diving has qualities of navigation because it is only possible with the external apparatus such as 
breathing gas regulators, swim fins, weight belts, and buoyancy compensators.  Id. ¶ 75.  
 132. In addition to the Saufley separate opinion in McGarvey, see Justice Saufley’s concurrence in 
Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 52, 760 A.2d 232 (Saufley, J., concurring) (“[E]ach time that the public and a 
private land owner clash over the scope of allowed recreational use of intertidal zones, the resolution 
will be uncertain.”). 
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been raised extensively by other Law Court justices and commentators.  Justice 
Wathen raised the same points relied on by the Saufley opinion in this case during 
his passionate dissent in Bell II.133  In his dissent, he argued that the holding of Bell 
II was a drastic change in precedent that would result in unfair and arbitrary 
outcomes for litigants.134  Justice Wathen reasoned that the public’s rights in the 
intertidal zone are not static, and should be flexible like any easement.135  He also 
noted the impracticality of adopting bright line rules in this area of the law,136 
criticizing the Bell II holding as creating “absurd and easily thwarted distinctions 
between permissible and impermissible activities.”137  Justice Wathen wrote for 
three members of the Court.138 
Following Justice Wathen’s dissent in Bell II, many commentators have 
likewise urged the Law Court to re-examine the narrow holding of Bell II.139  The 
arguments of most commentators criticize the narrow holding of the case, and 
frame it as an outlier that incorrectly interprets the Ordinance to the detriment of 
the public’s rights.140  Joining these commentators has been the State of Maine, 
who at every opportunity has urged the Law Court to reconsider the holding of Bell 
II.141   
The limiting language in Bell II is clearly a result of statutory interpretation.  
The Court drew from a 350-year old ordinance full of vague and ambiguous 
statutory language when it limited the public’s rights in the intertidal zone to 
fishing, fowling, and navigation.142  As stated above, the Ordinance does not 
include language that would limit the public’s rights in the intertidal zone to these 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 180-81 (1989) (Wathen, J., dissenting). 
 134. See id. at 188-89. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 189 (“I would not attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of the recreational 
activities that could fall within the common law rights of the public.”). 
 137. Id.  Justice Wathen quoted Maine Law Review’s discussion of how the narrow holding of Bell II 
would create unjust results: 
[A] narrow view would recognize the right to picnic in a rowboat while resting on the 
foreshore but brand as a trespass the same activities performed while sitting on a blanket 
spread on the foreshore.  The narrow view taken by the Massachusetts court does not 
exclude the public from walking on the foreshore as it purports; it merely requires that a 
person desiring to stroll along the foreshores of that state take with him a fishing line or 
net.  In keeping with the apparent purpose of the Colony Ordinance and its past decisions, 
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court can refuse to draw such a delicate distinction between 
the rights expressly reserved in the ordinance and similar recreational activities.  With 
such a refusal the court will avoid the anomalous result of declaring the same man a 
trespasser for bathing, who was no trespasser when up to his knees or neck in water, in 
search of a lobster, a crab, or a shrimp. 
Jeffrey D. Curtis, Coastal Recreation: Legal Methods for Securing Public Rights in the Seashore, 33 
ME. L. REV. 69, 83 (1981) (internal quotations omitted). 
 138. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 180.  
 139. See, e.g., Delogu, supra note 105, at 96-97; Orlando E. Delogu, Recent Developments: Eaton v. 
Town of Wells: A Critical Comment, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 225, 228 (2001); Robert George, The 
“Public Access Doctrine”: Our Constitutional Right to Sun, Surf, and Sand, 11 OCEAN AND COASTAL 
L.J. 73, 82 (2005). 
 140. See articles cited supra note 139.  
 141. See, e.g., Brief for the State of Maine as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, McGarvey, 2011 
ME 97, 28 A.3d 620 (No. Was–10–83). 
 142. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168. 
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three uses.  The word “only” did not appear in Maine’s public trust jurisprudence 
until the Bell II decision.143   
Finally, Justice Levy’s argument that if the Law Court revisits Bell II property 
rights reliance interests will be upset, is simply incorrect.  Upland owners’ title to 
intertidal land has always been subject to a public easement.144  If the public’s 
easement evolves to serve its original purpose, no taking arises because the 
property rights of upland property owners will not be infringed upon.145  The 
public’s easement was created to protect the jus publicum, a property right that 
changes with time.146  The Law Court can assure that it will not adversely affect 
reliance interests by only adopting uses that serve the purpose of the public 
easement, and the jus publicum, when it reexamines Bell II.  Additionally, only 
twenty-two years have passed since Bell II was decided.  Because of this relatively 
short time period, modifying Bell II will not upset a long line of precedent or 
upland owner expectations.147 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although scuba diving is now expressly permitted, the public’s right to access 
and use the intertidal zone has changed little as neither Chief Justice Saufley nor 
Justice Levy managed to muster the necessary votes for a majority.  McGarvey 
demonstrates that at least part of the Law Court is ready to expand Maine’s public 
trust doctrine beyond those uses envisioned in 1647 and the restrictive holding of 
Bell II. The Saufley separate opinion should be seen as a clear indication of this, 
while the Levy separate opinion is a reminder that part of the Court remains bound 
by the past, and Bell II’s errors. 
If Chief Justice Saufley gets another vote next time the Law Court has the 
occasion to address the public’s rights within the intertidal zone, the public’s 
easement in Maine’s intertidal zone will likely include the right to engage in 
accepted recreational uses of the day.  Until then, Maine’s public trust doctrine 
remains bound to the language of the past. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 143. If the Ordinance were interpreted literally, rights to access the intertidal zone would be limited 
to those who own a house.  The rights of homeowners would be limiting to fishing, fowling, and sailing.  
See THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETS, supra note 11, at 35. 
 144. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 9, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 145. See discussion supra Parts IV.B.2, B.3. 
 146. Delogu, supra note 105, at 96. 
 147. See Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 935 (Me. 1982). 
